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RATEMAKING ISSUES IN VIRGINIA:
SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION
ANDREw P. MILLER* AND HENRY M. MASSIE, JR.**
As one of the most powerful regulatory bodies in the United States,
the State Corporation Commission often has been referred to as the
fourth branch of government in the Commonwealth.1 The Commission
was created by section 155 of the 'Constitution of Virginia of 1902,
which conferred jurisdiction on it to prescribe the rates and regulate
the services of transportation and transmission companies, to create
and supervise corporations, and to levy state taxes on railroads and assess
their property subject to local taxation. 2 Section 156(c) of the Consti-
tution also provided that "[tihe Commission may be vested with such
additional powers, and charged with such other duties . . . as may be
prescribed by law in connection 'with the visitation, regulation or con-
trol of corporations." 3 Additional duties were imposed by statute on
the Commission in subsequent years.4 The Constitution of Virginia
provides that appeal from any final finding, decision settling the substan-
tive law, order, or judgment of the Commission is directly to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia as a matter of right.5
The authority of the Commission as to its constitutional grant of
power was made paramount to that of the General Assembly but, as
*A.B., Princeton University; LL.B. University of Virginia. Attorney General of Vir-
ginia.
**BA., LL.B., University of Virginia. Member of the Virginia Bar.
1. See Catterall, The State Corporation Connission of Virginia, 48 VA. L. REV. 139,
148 (1962).
2. The Commission is composed of 12 administrative divisions: 1) Clerk's Office, 2)
Enforcement Division, 3) Division of Aeronautics, 4) Motor Transportation Division,
5) Bureau of Insurance, 6) Public Service Taxation Division, 7) Division of Motor
Carrier Taxation, 8) Bureau of Banking, 9) Division of Securities and Retail Franchising,
10) Accounting Division, 11) Division of Public Utilities, and 12) Fire Marshal's Office.
This list represents the recent realignment of the Commission.
3. Judge Catterall has said that little attention was initially paid to the italicized
words; for example, today an individual cannot engage in the sport of sky diving unless
that individual, the parachute, the airplane, the pilot, and the drop zone are licensed by
the Commission.
4. Some of these additional responsibilities now include the regulation of insurance,
banking, public utilities, and the issuance of securities.
5. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (1971). However, Rule 5:18(g) of the Supreme Court Rules
provides that the action of the clerk in awarding the appeal is subject to court review.
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to its legislative grant, the Constitution provided that the General As-
sembly was superior. Article IX, section 2, of the present Constitu-
tion of Virginia, which became effective July 1, 1971, provides that
the Commission shall issue all charters of domestic corporations and
all licenses of foreign corporations to do business in this Common-
wealth, and charges the Commission with the duty of administering the
laws for the regulation and control of corporations doing business in
Virginia and regulating the rates, charges, and services of railroad, tele-
phone, gas and electric companies. Thus the constitutional grant of
power as to public utilities has been broadened to include gas and elec-
tric companies. The jurisdiction of the Commission over other public
utilides6 and in all other areas continues to be statutory, thus being
subject to the will of the General Assembly.
The Commissioners are elected by the members of the General As-
sembly and serve for staggered six year terms.7 The Constitution pro-
vides that at least one member of the Commission must have the qual-
ifications of a judge of a court of record. Although only one need have
the qualifications of a judge, the Commissioners themselves actually have
judicial, in addition to executive and legislative authority.' In adversary
proceedings before the Commission, the Commissioners should be looked
6. VA. CODE AN. § 12.1-12 (1973).
7. Article IX, section 1, of the new Constitution provides that there shall be three Com-
missioners; which number may be increased to no more than five by a majority vote
of the members elected to each House of the General Assembly. Bills introduced in
the 1972 session of the General Assembly to increase the members of the Commission
from three to five were defeated. H. 72, 97 & S. 113, 381, Reg. Sess. (1972). There are
conflicting views on the wisdom of increasing the number of Commissioners. Some
believe that it will improve the system by providing more and better representation for
diverse interests. Others contend that it will become more difficult to get things done
and increase the time required to reach agreement since at least three Commissioners
will have to concur in every decision. Consequently, they argue, little will be achieved
in reducing the workload; the regulatory machinery would simply be made more cum-
bersome. The advisability of increasing the membership could be resolved by a general
management study of the Commission. However, a resolution authorizing such a study
was defeated in the House Rules Committee in 1972. S.J. Res. 14, Reg. Sess. (1972).
In addition to the three member Commissioners, the General Assembly has provided
for a Commissioner of Insurance and a Commissioner of Banking to be appointed by the
member Commissioners. The powers and duties of these positions are delegated by the
Commission, which always retains ultimate decision making authority. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 12.1-16 (1973).
8. See Winchester § S.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 106 Va. 264, 55 S.E. 692 (1906); Nor-
folk & P.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 289, 49 S.E. 39 (1904); Atlantic Coast Line
Ry. v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 599, 46 S.E. 911 (1904). Virginia Code section 12.1-9
provides that administrative decisions may be made by one Commissioner whereas judi-
cial and legislative decisions require at least two Commissioners.
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upon by the parties as if they were judges in the courts of the Common-
wealth and the actions of the parties tailored accordingly.'
Certainly one of the most widely known and important responsibili-
ties of the Commission is that of prescribing rates, primarily the rates
for electric, gas, and telephone service and for automobile insurance.
These are matters that directly affect the pocket-book of every citizen
and therefore have been areas of great controversy in the Common-
wealth. The rates for electric, gas, and telephone service (public utili-
ties) are made according to an entirely different method of rate making
from those for automobile insurance because the former are fixed for
each company and the latter generally are fixed for a large group of
companies.
The method of public utility rate making employed in Virginia is
stated in Norfolk v. C. & P. Tel. Co.'0 :
Upon undertaking to fix rates for a public utility company of
this character, the Commission must necessarily first ascertain (a)
the value of the Company's property used and useful in the ren-
dition of its intrastate service, (b) its annual gross revenues, and
(c) its annual operating expenses. Upon accomplishing these ob-
jectives, it must then determine upon and set the percentage rate
of return at such a figure as will afford the utility reasonable
opportunity to earn a fair and just return on its investment.:"
Insurance rate-making, although less conducive to brief explanation,
generally involves determining the percentage of the premium dollar
devoted to expenses and profit, the balance of the dollar being the amount
that must be devoted to paying losses. Premiums are then adjusted up
or down depending on how much the actual percentage losses exceeded
or were below what the percentage figure should have been. In other
words, if the expenses including profit were set at 40 percent of every
premium dollar, 60 percent should be available to pay losses. If losses,
however, were 80 percent of every premium dollar, rates would have
to be increased to make more dollars available for losses.' 2 As one can
well imagine, the most troublesome and debated point in both public
9. Of course, in criminal and tax cases, the Commission, as a court, reviews its action
as a prosecutor. In such cases before the full Commission, it is often reviewing the ad-
ininistrative action of a single Commissioner. One is cited by Judge Catterall to "The
Mouse's Tale" in "Alice's Adventure In Wonderland."
10. 192 Va. 292,64 SE.2d 772 (1951).
11. Id. at 301-02, 64 S.E.2d at 777-78.
12. See Virginia AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 776, 167 S.E.2d 322 (1969).
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utility and insurance rate making is the profit factor.8 This is a critical
matter to the Commission, which is charged by the following sections
with fixing reasonable rates: 38.1-252, 38.1-279.5,14 and 56-234.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Rate increases by public utilities are initiated by filing an application
with the Commission. The case is set for hearing by order of the
Commission with requirements for notification to the public' 5 and dates
for the filing of testimony by all parties. After the order has been issued,
the case appears on the weekly docket of the Commission until it is
heard. Any party desiring to intervene can do so until the hearing has
commenced.' 6
The Fairfax Decision
It had always been thought that Virginia had only "Commission-
made rates" for public utilities.' 7 This meant that rates had to be
13. See Application of Portsmouth Gas Co., S.C.C. No. 19062 at 2, 3.
14. This section is a portion of an Act ruled unconstitutional by the Commission
on July 2, 1972. The decision is being appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.
15. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-237 (1950).
16. The mere fact that a party is allowed to intervene does not give that party
standing to appeal. Virginia Ass'n of Insurance Agents v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 249,
110 S.E.2d 223 (1959); Page v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 325, 160 S.E. 33 (1931). Compare
Young v. SCC, 205 Va. 111, 135 S2E.2d 129 (1964), 'with Commonwealth v. VEPCO, 211
Va. 758, 180 S.E.2d 675 (1971), in which neither Young nor The Building Owners and
Managers Association of Metropolitan Washington appeared in the proceeding before
the Corporation Commission.
It is advisable to intervene by a written pleading. Rule 5:18(h) of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Virginia provides that: "An intervener who has neither filed a written
pleading in the case nor requested in writing [before the notice of appeal was filed]
that he be joined as an appellee need not be made an appellee and no notice of appeal,
petition for appeal, brief, appendix to a brief or petition for rehearing need be served
on any such intervener." However, as a result of article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution,
Code Section 8-490.1 partially overrides this Rule in that it requires notice of appeal to
be served on interveners who have neither filed a written pleading in the case nor
requested in writing that they be joined as an appellee. The rule has been changed
effective April 16, 1973.
17. Commonwealth v. Old Dominion Power Co., 184 Va. 6, 34 S.E.2d 364, cert. denied,
326 U.S. 760 (1945); Alkali Works v. Northern & W.Ry., 147 Va. 426, 137 S.E. 608
(1927). Temporary emergency relief, however, can be obtained pursuant to section 56-
245 until such time as final rates can be approved. The supreme court has requested
briefs in a case involving VEPCO (Records Nos. 7904, 7905, 7906) presently before it
as to whether or not an order granting a temporary increase under this statute is mature
for decision by the court. This section amended by the 1973 General Assembly to allow
temporary relief simply upon a finding of an "emergency" by the Commission.
[Vol. 14:601
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approved by the Commission before they could be used by a utility,
regardless of whether the rates became effective pursuant to sec-
tion 56-238 or section 56-240 (utility applications go into effect as
originally filed unless suspended by the Commission). Thus, it was stated
by Commissioner Ralph T. Catterall: "[O]ur uniform practice of sus-
pending telephone rates that we disapprove means that failure to suspend
means approval of the rates." I
However, in Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. C & P Tel.
Co.,19 Justice Thomas C. Gordon, Jr., stated: "We agree with the Com-
pany's contention that Section 56-240 sanctions company-made rates
because it provides that rate schedules filed by a public utility become
effective unless the Commission acts to suspend them." 2o It therefore
appeared that all public-service companies, except telephone companies,
could use "company-made rates" which had not been approved, if the
Commission elected not to suspend the filed rates before the effective
date requested in the application."
It is interesting to note, however, that section 56-35, as amended by
the 1971 session of the General Assembly, substituted the phrase "pub-
lic service companies" for the phrase "transportation and transmission
companies" so that the statute now reads in pertinent part: "[T]he
Commission shall, from time to time, prescribe and enforce against
[public service companies] such rates, charges .... " 22 This language
raises a question as to whether section 56-240 sanctioning "company-
made rates" conflicts with section 56-3523 and, if so, whether the Com-
mission can sanction "company-made rates" for any public service
company at this time.
18. Letter to Henry E. Howell, Jr., April 19, 1971, attached as Exhibit "A" to Reply
Brief of Appellant, Henry E. Howell, Jr., to Supplemental Brief of Appellee C & P Tel.
Co. of Virginia-Requested by Court, No. 7506 (Va. 1971).
19. 212 Va. 57, 182 S.E.2d 30 (1971).
20. Id. at 61, 182 S.E.2d at 32.
21. The Court stated that telephone companies, however, had to proceed under sec-
tion 56-478, which "sanctions only 'commission-made rates' because it provides that
only those rates prescribed by the Commission become effective." Id.
22. It should not be argued that the words "from time to time" mean that the statute
contemplates methods of setting rates other than Commission prescription. These same
words appeared in article XII, section 156(b) of the 1902 Constitution, which was inter-
preted in the Fairfax case.
23. That the General Assembly thought there was no conflict is apparent from the
fact that both sections were reenacted simultaneously. This was before the Fairfax de-
cision came down in June of 1971, however.
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Since the Fairfax decision, rendered pursuant to section 156(b) of
the 1902 Constitution which directed Commission prescription of rates
for "transportation and transmission" companies, Virginia has adopted
a new Constitution. Article IX, section 2 contains no requirement for
Commission prescription of rates. In Fairfax, the court had explained
that, in order to avoid holding section 56-241 unconstitutional, "we...
interpret that section as prescribing that the Commission's power over
telephone company rates shall be as provided in Chapter 10 and 15 of
Title 56 only insofar as those chapters do not conflict. And, insofar as
those chapters do conflict, Chapter 15 dealing specifically with tele-
phone companies, prevails." ' As a result, it is debatable whether section
56-240 now applies to telephone companies, since no conflict exists with
the 1971 Constitution, irrespective of the possible conflict presented
by section 56-35.
A strong argument can be made that, in the absence of any conflict
between the Constitution and the statute, there is no compelling reason
to interpret section 56-241 so as to avoid the construction which sanc-
tions "company-made rates" for telephone companies. The Commission
has not yet employed the now constitutionally permissible procedure
of allowing "company-made rates" for all privately owned utilities.
There does not appear to be any rational basis for denying this option
to telephone companies, and the new Constitution permits such a
practice.
The exact "nature of the beast" known as the "company-made rate" is
not defined. For example, must a customer who feels he is charged
unfairly demand a hearing before the Commission, or can he appeal
immediately to the Supreme Court of Virginia? The court expressly did
not consider this question in Fairfax: "We leave open the question raised
by the Company whether an appeal lies to this Court from a decision
of the Commission pursuant to section 56-240 to permit proposed rates
to go into effect automatically as a result of the Commission's failure to
suspend them." 25 Since the language of section 56-240 speaks of appeal
from action of the Commission "prescribing" rates, it is apparent that
"company-made rates" are not mature for appeal. If, upon complaint
concerning a "company-made rate," a full investigation cannot be com-
pleted for many months, can the persons paying the "company-made
rate" obtain reparation, and what test period must the Commission
24. 212 Va. at 62, 182 S.E.2d at 33.
25. Id. at 63 n.4, 182 S.E.2d at 34 n.4.
[Vol. 14:601
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employ to determine whether the rate is "just and reasonable?" These
are but two issues that will confront the State Corporation Commission
and the Virginia courts in the future.
Rate Prescription-The Portsmouth Gas Case
The supreme court has adopted the following definition of "prescribe"
in Commonwealth v. Old Dominion Power Co..96 "According to Web-
ster's International Dictionary, 2d Ed., 'prescribe' means: 'To lay
down authoritatively as a guide, direction, or rule of action.' "27 The
Virginia statutes contain no requirement for a public hearing as a pre-
requisite to the prescription of rates for public utilities, although some
court statements imply as much.2 Section 56-245 assumes a hearing on
"the final determination of rates" before temporary emergency relief can
be granted. Justice Gordon appeared to state a firm position on this
point in the all-important Fairfax decision: "The proceeding... did not
satisfy the procedural due-process requirement of a full hearing on the
question of the approval or prescription of rates by the Commission." 2
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court stated in Railroad Com-
mission v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.80 that: "The right to a fair and open
hearing is one of the rudiments of fair play assured to every litigant by the
Federal Constitution as a minimum requirement... There must be due
notice and an opportunity to be heard, the procedure must be con-
sistent with the essentials of a fair trial, and the Commission must act
upon evidence and not arbitrarily.... ." 1 In addition to a full hearing and
complete record containing the necessary relevant information, there
should be a complete statement of the reasons upon which the action
26. 184 Va. 6 (1945).
27. Id. at. -.
28. See Norfolk v. VEPCO, 197 Va. 505, 518, 90 S.E.2d 140, 149 (1955); C & P Tel.
Co. v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 43, 53, 136 S.E. 575, 577 (1927); Appalachian Power Co.
v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 1, 9, 110 S.E. 360, 363 (1922). The General Assembly, how-
ever, has made it discretionary whether a hearing is held when the proposed revision
in rates "effects no increases." VA. Coon ANN. § 56-40 (1950). Such rates may well be
"Commission-made."
29. 212 Va. at 62, 182 S.E.2d at 33 (emphasis supplied). Judge Catterall's opinion,
however, is that the due process clause can be invoked only by companies that are the
only parties from which property may be confiscated. Customers of the companies,
he argues, are protected by the "just and reasonable" clauses in the law. One authority
cited by him is Norfolk v. C & P Tel. Co., 192 Va. 292, 301, 64 S.E.2d 772, 777 (1951).
30. 302 U.S. 388 (1938).
31. Id. at 393.
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of the Commission was based 82 which, under Virginia law, unfortu-
nately need not be written until an appeal is taken. 3
In all cases in which application for an increase in rates is made by
a privately owned public utility, a hearing is held before a rate increase
is granted. During these hearings, the Commission is perfoming in its
legislative-capacity.34 Nevertheless, the decision of the Commission must
be supported by the evidence of record." The extent of this legislative
capacity is not defined. Basically, such hearings are characterized as
legislative because they are concerned with prescribing rates for the
future rather than being concerned with matters that have occurred
in the past."" The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that a legisla-
tive body is acting in a legislative capacity when it "prescribes a course
of conduct." 37 The legislative nature of the hearing relieves the Com-
mission of the strict rules of evidence that govern a judicial proceeding. 8
The Commission has further interpreted it, and the Supreme Court has
quoted this interpretation, to "permit the record to contain all material
32. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. C & P Tel. Co., 212 Va. 57, 182 S.E.2d
30 (1971); Appalachian Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 1, 110 S.E. 360 (1922);
VA. CODE A-N. § 12.1-39 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
38. VA. CODE Am. § 12.1-39 (Cum. Supp. 1971). The Commission, however, appears
to be writing opinions voluntarily in support of its more important decisions. This prac-
tice is desirable, as parties often cannot determine whether to appeal until given an op-
portunity to study the reasons for the Commission's action. Otherwise, notice of appeal
would have to be filed merely to get an opinion from the Commission upon which the
decision to appeal could be based.
34. Lynchburg v. C & P Tel. Co, 200 Va. 706, 107 S.E.2d 462 (1959); Board of Super-
visors v. VEPCO, 196 Va. 1102, 87 S.E.2d 139 (1955); Norfolk v. C & P Tel. Co., 192
Va. 292, 64 S.E.2d 772 (1951).
85. Board of Supervisors v. C & P Tel. Co., 212 Va. 57, 182 S.E.2d 30 (1971); Board
of Supervisors v. Alexandria Water Co., 207 Va. 432, 150 S2E.2d 100 (1966); Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Commonwealth, 160 Va. 698, 169 S.E. 859 (1933); Roanoke Water Works Co. v.
Commonwealth, 137 Va. 348, 119 S.E. 268 (1923). But, the legislative nature of the
hearing relieves the Commission of the strict rules of evidence that govern a judicial
proceeding. VA. CODE Amw. § 12.1-30 (Cum. Supp. 1971), states that when sitting in its
judicial capacity, the Commission "shall observe and administer the common and statute
law rules of evidence," the clear implication being that the judicial rules of evidence do
not apply in nonjudicial cases. See also Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 162 Va.
314, 174 S.E. 85 (1934).
36. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 134 F.2d 287, 309-10 (4th Cir.
1943); rev'd on other grounds, 320 U.S. 591, (1944); Baer Bros. v. Denver & R.G.R.R.,
233 U.S. 479, 486 (1914).
87. Blankenship v. Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 103, 49 S.E.2d 321, 323 (1948).
38. Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 314, 174 S.E.85 (1934) See note
35 supra.
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offered." 39 The legislative nature of the hearing also provides the Com-
mission with a broad area of discretion in which it can exercise its
judgment.40 However, this legislative capacity is apparently not as
broad as that exercised by a legislative committee; the court previously
has cautioned that there is evidence that should not influence the action
of the Commission, but "the order of the Commission will not be re-
versed because it admitted, or admitted and took into consideration,
evidence which it should not have considered, unless it be plain that it
permitted its conclusions to be determined by the improper evi-
dence." 4' The simple fundamental that must be emphasized is that basic
fairness dictates that all evidence received into the record by the Com-
mission or relied upon by the Commission in making its decision must
be disclosed to all parties for examination and comment.12 Furthermore,
the applicant must carry its burden of proof43 and in presenting its case
there are certain basic elements that must be proved.
In an attempt to provide some definition in the foregoing area, the At-
torney General's Office appealed a rate increase granted to the Ports-
mouth Gas Company, questioning whether expert testimony was nec-
essary to support the requested rate of return. Commonwealth v. Ports-
mouth Gas Company,44 decided September 1, 1972, held that expert
testimony on the rate of return is not such a fact as must support the
Commission's decision in determining a rate.45 By presenting non-expert
testimony, the utility merely risks non-persuasion.46 The court appar-
ently allows "the Commission [to] apply its knowledge of cost of
39. Commonwealth v. VEPCO, 211 Va. 758, 771 (1971).
40. Commonwealth v. VEPCO, 211 Va. 758 (1971); N & W Ry. Co. v. Common-
wealth, 162 Va. 312 (1934).
41. 162 Va. at 323.
42. Judge Catterall notes that section 156(f) of the old Constitution expressly stated
that the Commission could rely on matters of common knowledge where it required
the record on appeal to contain the evidence "introduced or considered." Certainly, the
Commission can take notice that interest rates are high. Evidence should be taken,
though, as to how high.
43. See Dyer and Moorefield v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 147 Va. 98, 101 136 S.E.
499, 500 (1927).
44. 213 Va. 239 (1972).
45. Contra, Washington Gas Light v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 952 (1951).
46. There is still little indication as to where the line may be drawn regarding the
amount of evidence required to carry the burden of proof. The Fairfax case makes it
clear that the Commission cannot simply apply its expertise to facts not in the record
and prescribe a lawful rate.
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capital and fair rate of return on equity, obtained from other sources,
to the facts." 47
The Portsmouth case is difficult to reconcile with the language in
Fairfax. Moreover, the case is troublesome in that no opportunity exists
for the parties to examine and cross-examine these "other sources." Cross-
examination of a witness who does not possess the necessary expertise
is useless. All that can be established is that he is unable to make the
judgments necessary to establish a rate of return. However, the court
did appear to distinguish cases in which the jurisdictional rate base and net
annual earnings are contested. 4 The basis for this distinction is unclear,
and no readily ascertainable reason for it is apparent; nevertheless, the
court stated: "Usually the jurisdictional rate base and the net annual
earnings during the prescribed test period are contested, as well as the
ultimate question of fair return on rate base which, of course, requires
a consideration of cost of debt and cost of equity capital. Under such
circumstances, expert testimony is a practical necessity. But where,
as here, the basic facts are not controverted, expert testimony, while
desirable, is not mandatory." 4 9 The obvious implication is that expert
testimony is mandatory in cases where basic facts are controverted.
Consumer Representation
Article IX, section 2, of the Constitution of Virginia (1971), pro-
vides that the Commission must insure that the interests of consumers
are represented in proceedings before it, unless the General Assembly
otherwise provides for such representation. Pursuant to Code section
2.1-133.1 the General Assembly created a Division of Consumer
Counsel within the office of the Attorney General which, as one of
its duties, appears before the Commission on behalf of consumers. The
Division since its inception in June of 1970 has appeared in over 100
cases before the Commission involving such matters as rates, service
investigations, and other matters affecting consumers. It works closely
with the legal division and staff of the Commission to insure that any
matters adversely affecting the interests of the consumer are controlled
47. 213 Va. at 242, 191 S.E.2d at 222 (emphasis supplied).
48. Ironically, the only reason these elements were not disputed in the Portsmouth
case was because "at the outset of the hearing counsel for the Company accepted [the
Commission's] adjustments...." Id. at 240, 191 S.E.2d at 221.
49. Id. at 242, 191 S.E.2d at 222-23. The word "mandatory" in this context seems
to be synonymous with "required by law."
[Vol. 14: 601
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.and regulated properly. This duty consists of appearing in cases and
presenting evidence, cross-examining witnesses, preparing legal briefs
-and arguments, and appealing adverse decisions. It also consists of
improving and defining the law and procedures in this area. °
The greatest dilemma in ratemaking that has been observed in the
-course of appearing in rate cases on a regular basis is the matter of
-excessive regulatory lag.5' Rates for public utilities in Virginia are set
,on the basis of the experience of a previous test year, and by the time
the new rates finally become effective, they may be out of date in that
the costs on which they are based have either increased or decreased.52
It is for this reason that the supreme court, in Commonwealth v.
VEPCO,5 3 has pointed out that the proceedings are legislative and that
rates are made for the future. The difficult problem then arises of deter-
mining how far into the future the Commission should go in setting rates.
Moreover, it is not consistent to project the expenses and the capital
structure of a company into the future without also projecting its rev-
enues and rate base.
In an attempt to face these problems squarely, the office of the Attor-
ney General sponsored a bill which was passed by the 1972 session of the
General Assembly providing for annual review of the rates of public
utilities "when, in the opinion of the Commission, such annual review
50. In appeals from the Commission an odd situation can arise pursuant to the Rules of
Court. A rate case may have numerous intervenors with very different interests. Inter-
venors who have filed written pleadings in the case are designated as appellees when
2n appeal is taken. Rule 5:6 requiring filing of assignments of cross error does not apply
to appeals from the Commission pursuant to Rule 5:18 (a). The appellee, however, may as-
sign cross-error in his brief pursuant to Rule 5:20. If no additional designation of the rec-
ord is made by an appellee, the strange result is that no parties know which of such ap-
pellees are going to file briefs in the case or what, if any, cross-error any such appellee
may assign and argue against any other appellee. Furthermore, once all the briefs of the
appellees are filed, the only party with an absolute right to reply is the appellant, who
may be very much in sympathy with many of the assignments of cross-error made by
the appellees. As to intervenors who have not filed a written pleading in the case or
requested in writing that they be joined as appellees, section 8-490.1 overrides Rule
5:18(h) in part, in that such intervenors must be sent a Notice of Appeal. Within
21 days thereafter, an intervenor in this class must inform the appellant of his intention
to participate in the appeal. Effective April 16, 1973, the rules were modified to correct
these deficiencies. 213 Va. 459 (1973).
51. See Commonwealth v. VEPCO, 211 Va. 758, 180 S.E.2d 675 (1971).
52. In Howell v. Catterall, 212 Va. 525, 186 SE.2d 28 (1972), the court pointed out
that inordinate delay could jeopardize a utility's "continued ability to render effective
public service to its customers:' Id. at 527, 186 S.E.2d at 30.
53. 211 Va. 758, 180 S.E.2d 675 (1971).
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is in the public interest." 54 Accordingly, in the critical 1972 VEPCO
case,55 the Commission stated in its majority opinion that "no projections
will be considered beyond December, 1972," one year after the end of
the test period. This was an important decision providing necessary
guidelines which can be relied upon in the future.
After determining the proper revenues and expenses for rate-making,
the Commission must find a jurisdictional rate base. By employing an
original cost rate base, the multitude of problems presented in con-
structing a reproduction cost rate base are avoided.5 6 Original cost
is also "among the lowest, if not the lowest, element to be taken into
consideration in determining the fair value or rate base." 11 The Com-
mission also employs an end-of-period rate base "to offset the lag in
the return of earnings during the period between the time the money
is invested and the earnings are received." 58
If the end-of-period rate base of an expanding utility had been in
existence throughout the test period, it would have generated consid-
erably more revenues and expenses than those reflected in the historical
test period figures. The criticism of using this type of approach to offset
regulatory lag is that there does not appear to be any direct correlation
between the effect on the utility of regulatory lag and the increment
gained by the use of the end-of-period rather than the average rate base.
The average rate base is the plant that generated the test period revenues
and expenses and, from an accounting point of view, provides a more
logical matching of investment with the relevant revenues and expenses.
After deciding upon a jurisdictional rate base, the Commission applies
a percentage rate of return figure to the rate base in order to determine
the necessary net operating income that the company should earn from
54. VA. CODE AN. § 56-234.2 (Cum. Supp. 1972). The Commission has since adopted
detailed rules and regulations explaining its policy of annual review for certification by
the Price Commission in S.C.C. No. 19147.
55. Application of VEPCO, S.C.C. No. 19027 (June 28, 1972).
56. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Roanoke Water Works Co. v. Common-
wealth, 140 Va. 144, 171, 124 S.E. 652, 660 (1924) (The court became so frustrated with
attempting to determine present value that it suggested "as a panacea for this grievous
economic evil the application of the 'golden rule theory' upon the part of both the
seller and the consumer."); Petersburg Gas Co. v. Petersburg, 132 Va. 82, 110 S.E. 533
(1922); In re C & P Tel. Co., 85 P.U.R.N.S. 435 (S.C.C. 1950), aff'd, 192 Va. 292, 64
S.E.2d 772 (1951).
57. Board of Supervisors v. VEPCO, 196 Va. 1102, 1111, 87 S.E.2d 139, 145 (1955);
see also Board of Supervisors v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 963, 975, 45 S.E.2d 145, 150,
(1947).
58. Lynchburg v. C & P Tel. Co., 200 Va. 706, 716, 107 S.E.2d 462, 469 (1959); In re
VEPCO, 9 P.U.R.3d 225, 230-31 (1953), aff'd, 196 Va. 1102, 87 S.E.2d 139 (1955).
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this investment.59 Judicial guidelines have been provided for determin-
ing the proper percentage rate of return.60 Generally, the judicial guide-
lines can be broken down into a "capital attraction" approach which
attempts to analyze investor expectations and motivations and a "com-
parable earnings" approach which analyzes what capital can earn in
various alternatives with comparable risks. It has been suggested that the
two approaches provide conflicting standards; 1 regardless of the merits
of such contentions, the rate of return is an area of wide discretion
based on evidence of record, judgment, and experience. 2
The Commission computes the rate of return on the total capitaliza-
tion of the company.6 3 Logically, the total capital upon which the rate
of return is formulated should be computed as of the same date as that
of the rate base to which it is applied. The relevant investment should
be matched with the capital it seeks to protect. 4 The primary reason
for determining a jurisdictional rate base under present circumstances,
in which the issuance of securities by the utility is regulated and the
stock is not "watered," is to charge the customers of the utility under
the jurisdiction of the Commission rates proportionate to the Com-
pany's investment to serve them. 5 The capital of many utilities may not
59. The net operating income is the income after all expenses including depreciation
and taxes, but before the capital costs.
60. Federal Power Comrn'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602, rehearing
denied, 321 U.S. 802 (1944); Bluefield Water Works Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262
U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923); Commonwealth v. VEPCO, 211 Va. 758, 769, 180 SE.2d 675,
682 (1971); Norfolk v. Chesapeake Tel. Co., 192 Va. 292, 317, 64 S.E.2d 772, 783 (1951);
Petersburg Gas Co. v. Petersburg, 132 Va. 82, 89-90, 110 S2. 533, 535 (1922).
61. See In re C & P Tel. Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 239, 250-51 (S.C.C. 1957) (Catterall, Comm'r,
concurring); In re VEPCO, 9 P.U.R.3d 225, 248-49 (S.C.C. 1953).
62. Lynchburg v. C & P Tel. Co., 200 Va. 706, 107 S.E.2d 462 (1959); Board of Super-
visors v. VEPCO, 196 Va. 1102, 87 SE.2d 139 (1955); Norfolk v. C & P Tel. Co., 192
Va. 292, 64 S.E.2d 772 (1951); C & P Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 43, 136 S.E.
575 (1927).
63. See Commonwealth v. VEPCO, 211 Va. 758, 180 SE.2d 675 (1971). In some cases,
however, it may be necessary to develop a hypothetical debt-equity ratio as Judge Cat-
terall said should have been done in Lynchburg v. C & P Tel. Co., 200 Va. 706, 719, 107
S.E.2d 462, 471 (1959). Although the supreme court did not feel that the evidence in
that case warranted overturning the decision of the majority of the Commission to
follow Judge Catterall's suggestion, it appears that almost 13 years later his view in that
case has become the unanimous view of the Commission as indicated by a ruling from the
bench in Record No. 19152 involving the same C & P Tel. Co.
64. In Commonwealth v. VEPCO, 211 Va. 758, 180 SE.2d 675 (1971), witnesses spec-
ulated on the rate of return on the total capital of the company as far as three years
after the end of the test period or the date of the rate base. This is different from the
use of a hypothetical debt-equity ratio in that imbedded costs are also projected.
65. Id. at 766.
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be devoted entirely to its utility business, or it may be devoted to serv-
ing other customers not under the Commission's jurisdiction. The close
correlation between rate base and rate of return in such a circumstance
must be recognized as the rate base is merely an assignment of a portion
of the total capitalization of the company to a particular jurisdiction
for the purpose of determining the dollars that jurisdiction should con-
tribute to a fair return for the utility's capital. 6
One way to decrease the lag would be to use a fully projected test
period one year into the future.0 7 This approach would also work well
with the annual review system. But since this procedure's objective
would be to make rates more representative of costs being experienced
during the period the rates are used, there would no longer be any basis
for compensating by the use of an end-of-period rate base. An average
rate base should be used projected six months into the future after the
end of the most recent 12-month period for which the necessary basic
information is available.
The rate of return also should be based on the capital outstanding at
the time the rate base is determined. The relevant revenues and ex-
penses would be those projected for the full 12 month period. Actually,
the revenues and expenses would be those of the most recent 12 month
period adjusted to show the experience that can be expected for the
next 12 months under the existing rates. 8 Any additional adjustments
for factors affecting the rate of return that can be quantified specifically
should be separately considered, given a percentage value, and added to
or subtracted from the percentage rate of return on total capital when
it is translated into a rate of return on rate base. Rate of return is the
proper place to recognize such adjustments rather than in the rate base,
revenues, or expenses. Such necessary adjustments, if any, to offset re-
curring discrepancies in the return allowed and the return experienced
66. This requirement illustrates the absurdity of not having a standard procedure for
allocating rate base in all jurisdictions in which the utility operates. Otherwise, some
portions of the capital may be compensated more than once or not at all. Telephone
companies have a basic method of allocation which is used universally, but electric and
gas companies must assume the risk of differing allocation procedures.
67. Objection might be raised on the basis that a portion of the projected rate base
is not "used and useful" as required by Virginia law. But the response is that it is "used
and useful" within the meaning of those words in relation to the revenues, expenses, and
capital that are also projected.
68. The Commission presently requires companies to present 12-month projections
with each rate application. Over a period of time, the reliability of such projections for
the purpose of setting rates could be judged.
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should become well known to the Commission since it will be dealing
with the utility annually.
The determination of a proper rate of return is essentially a matter
of judgment and experience. Parties choosing to appeal a rate decision
are faced with a presumption of correctness in favor of the Commis-
sion.6 Reversal requires a clear showing of abuse of discretion rather
than mere technical deficiency.70
The Office of Attorney General also sponsored a resolution (S.J. Res.
37 failed to pass the 1972 General Assembly) urging the Commission
to adopt more comprehensive rules and procedures. The purpose of the
resolution was to provide guidelines in the areas of discovery procedures,
introduction of evidence, cross-examination of witnesses, and the status
of intervenors. The Commission staff presently is engaged in drafting
revised rules and procedures consistent with the resolution's thrust.
There are other areas where further legislation may prove helpful.
Sections 56-8.2 and 56-239, as amended by the 1971 Session of the
General Assembly, provide that in any appeal from the Commission's
action prescribing or affecting rates of a public utility, the final order
of the supreme court shall provide for refund of the difference, if any,
between the rates prescribed by the Commission and those finally fixed.71
If the "company-made rate" provision in section 56-240 is used, there
should be no question of the Commission's authority to refund the dif-
ference between the filed rate and the final rate fixed after investi-
gation. A statute should be enacted giving the Commission such
authority. 72
69. Although the 1971 Constitution of Virginia makes no reference to the presump-
tion of correctness contained in section 156(f) of the Constitution of 1902, there can be
little doubt that decisions of the Commission carry a judicially recognized presumption
of correctness. 73 CJ.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 205 at 556-57
(1951). See also Commonwealth v. Portsmouth Gas Co., 213 Va. 239, 191 S.E.2d 220
(1972); Norfolk & P.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 284, 297, 49 S.E. 39, 42 (1904)
(commissioners presumed to be experts in the matter of rates and charges).
70. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944)
(the "end result" theory); 2 A. PamsT, PINCIPLE oF PuBLic UTIY R GULA o 502-03
(1969).
71. It is emphasized that the wording of these statutes in part is: "In any appeal..
(emphasis supplied). The statute appears to apply to appeals by the utility or any inter-
venor.
72. Such legislation would be similar to and perform the same function as 49 U.S.C.
§ 15(7) (1970), which gives the I.C.C. authority to grant refunds in the case of "com-
pany-made rates."
73. On remand of Board of Supervisors v. C & P Tel. Co., 212 Va. 57, 182 S.E.2d 30
(1971), the Commission ordered the company to refund the excess rates. Much time
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Legislation also should be adopted providing for a two-part hearing
in a rate case.74 The first part of the hearing should concern the rate
of return and the dollar increase to which the utility is entitled. The
second part should assign the various categories of customers from
whom these dollars are to be raised. This latter determination relates
to fair and equitable rate schedules. A party should be able to intervene
in either or both parts of the hearing.
The principal advantage of the suggested two-step proceeding is
that it would enable the participants in phase two to know the precise
amount of revenue the company must raise from its jurisdictional cus-
tomers at the time of considering rate design. Thus, the interests of the
parties could be represented more knowledgeably than is feasible in a
unitary hearing. Furthermore, this procedure would correct the very
troublesome situation that arises when a utility applies for a rate increase
of $1,000,000 implemented by certain rate schedules which are exam-
ined at the hearing, but the utility is finally awarded an increase of only
$500,000 which is implemented by different rate schedules which are
never examined at the hearing and which may require a proportionately
greater number of dollars to be paid by one customer, or class of cus-
tomers, than did the original schedules.
The supreme court has said that failure to hold a second hearing is
not a denial of due process, 75 but it also has held that granting a "differ-
ent kind of rate schedule" from that contemplated by the parties with-
out further examination does amount to a due process deprivation.
76
The most orderly procedure would be to delay any consideration of
rate design until a decision on the total revenue needs of the utility has
been made. If the projected test year concept were employed, the
was spent in argument over whether the Commission had the authority to order refunds
and, if, so, how it was to be accomplished. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, the refund order was affirmed on the basis that "a failure to comply with the
Constitution of Virginia and with the statute is [not] a mere procedural imperfection
or oversight." C & P Tel. Co. v. Arlington County, 213 Va. 339, 341 (1972).
74. The Commission agreed to such a course of action on motion of the Attorney
General in the recent C & P Tel. Co. application for an increase in rates. Record No.
19152 (1972).
75. Commonwealth v. VEPCO, 211 Va. 758, 772, 180 S.E.2d 675, 685 (1971).
76. Appalachian Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 1, 9, 110 S.E. 360, 363 (1922)
(rate schedule contemplated at hearing fixed separate rates upon primary or secondary
power whereas rate schedule finally granted fixed a uniform fiat rate).
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number of dollars generated by the proposed schedules should then
be based on a billing analysis of the projected period. 77
The confusion surrounding sections 56-35 and 56-240 also should be
settled by the legislature. The requirement of Commission prescrip-
tion of rates ought to be removed from section 56-35. It would be
advisable to frame such an amendment in language similar to article IX,
section 2, of the Virginia Constitution. Section 56-240 also should be
amended to apply expressly to telephone companies, since there is no
rational basis for allowing the "company-made rate" provision to apply
to other public utilities but not to telephone companies. Specific refer-
ence to telephone companies would involve a simple amendment and
would eliminate the present ambiguity. Finally, repeal of sections 56-
478 and amendment of 56-241 is appropriate since the rates of telephone
companies, as well as those of other utilities, would be provided for in
Chapter 10 of Title 56.78
THE CORPORATION COMMISSION AND THE VIRGINIA INSURANCE INDUSTRY
The authority of the Commission to regulate insurance companies
is provided in section 38.1-29 of the Code of Virginia. The kinds of
insurance business which the companies may transact in Virginia are
classified and defined in article 2 of tide 38.1 of the Code.
In the area of automobile insurance, there are various kinds of insur-
ance that may be involved in a rate hearing. Generally, they are either
liability insurance, which is insurance against loss by another caused
by fault of the insured, or first party coverage of the person and prop-
erty of the insured in which claims are paid regardless of fault. Liability
insurance involves personal injury liability and property damage lia-
bility. They are treated separately for rate making purposes. First party
coverage involves damage to any property of the insured resulting from
collision, comprehensive coverage involving damage to the automobile
77. Decisions would have to be made concerning anticipated weather conditions, rate
of increase in customers, and other various factors.
78. After the original drafting of this Article, Delegate Phillip Morris at the request
of the Attorney General's Office introduced House Bills 1504, 1505, 1506, and 1509 in
the 1973 session of the General Assembly to make the needed improvements and cor-
rections referred to above. The most notable improvement is the addition of a refund
provision to Code section 56-240. The fact and amount of refund is made discretionary
with the Commission as the purpose of this amendment was simply to establish the
authority of the Commission to award refunds in the case of a legally established "com-
pany-made rate."
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by other than collision, loss of personal possessions contained therein,
and medical payments insurance for injury to the person of the in-
sured and his passengers. There have been numerous reasons assigned
for the present high cost of automobile insurance, i.e., congested high-
ways, inflated labor costs, high hospital and other medical expenses, and
paper thin motor vehicles, but the fact remains that automobile insurance
is costly and is a matter of great concern to the motoring public.
The business of insurance in Virginia and elsewhere occupies an
unusual and enviable position in the law. Although obviously a highly
competitive industry, it is not subject to the federal anti-trust laws. The
Supreme Court of the United States held many years ago that issuing
a policy of insurance was not commerce and therefore was a proper
subject of state regulation in Paul v. Virginia.7 9 Thereafter, the case of
Gennan Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansass° held that the business of insurance
was "'clothed with a public interest' and therefore subject 'to be con-
trolled by the public for the common good.' "81 Subsequently, the
Supreme Court, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,2
overruled its holding in the Paul case when confronted with federal,
rather than state law, deciding that the business of insurance was in
fact commerce among the states and subject to the federal anti-trust
laws.
As an immediate reaction to the South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n
case, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act 8 which provided
that federal legislation would not be enacted to pre-empt state law in
the area of insurance regulation, except that the business of insurance
should be subject to the federal anti-trust laws "to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law." 8 This Act has been interpreted
to support any state system generally regulating the business of in-
surance.85 The case of Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Board,6
goes even further in stating that "there is nothing in the language of
79. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
80. 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
81. Id. at 415.
82. 322 U.S. 533, rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 811 (1944).
83. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-12 (1963).
84. See Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606, 611 (2d
Cir. 1969).
85. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930
(1966); Fleming v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 324 F. Supp. 1404 (D.C. Mass. 1971);
California League of Ind. Ins. Pro. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal.
1959).
86. 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971).
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the McCarran Act or in its legislative history to support the thesis that
the Act does not apply when the state's scheme of regulation has not
been effectively enforced." 87 Petition for certiorari was filed with the
United States Supreme Court in this case on April 27, 1972, one of the
questions being whether:
On motion to dismiss complaint alleging Sherman Act violations
relating to automobile insurance price fixing, does McCarran Act
grant immunity to defendants as matter of law in face of factual
allegations, supported by affidavits, that state does not "effectively"
regulate the industry and has, in fact, abdicated its function in
favor of regulation by industry itself?88
This issue is of extreme importance, since a reversal of the holding of the
Sixth Circuit could well sound the death knell for the so-called "com-
petitive pricing laws" in effect in many states.
The Virginia Prior Approval System
Rates for automobile insurance in Virginia are determined by a "prior
approval" system89-the Commission must approve rates before they
can be used by the companies.90 Different considerations are involved
than those for public utilities because, unlike public utilities, insurance
companies have no monopoly. In determining a fair rate for insurance
companies, section 38.1-269 allows them to pool their experience.91
This "experience" is accumulated and filed by a licensed rating or-
ganization, and the rates thereby established (manual rates) may be
used by all member or subscriber companies. Such companies also may
file and use a uniform deviation from these rates if sufficient supporting
information is supplied to the Commission and approval is obtained.92
87. Id. at 1184.
88. 40 U.SL.W. 3545 (U.S. May 16, 1972). The Supreme Court has since denied
certiorari in this case with Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting. 41 U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S. Oct.
17, 1972).
89. Public notice and a hearing on proposed rate increases generally are accorded
prior to Commission approval, but neither is required. Section 38.1-254 makes the matter
of publication and hearing discretionary with the Commission.
90. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-253 (1950). The 1972 session of the General Assembly
passed a "competitive pricing" or "no prior approval" law which was signed by the
Governor to become effective on July 1, 1972. The Commission held this statute un-
constitutional by order of July 6, 1972. The matter is on appeal to the Supreme Court
of Virginia.
91. The companies are exempted from the prohibition of the federal anti-trust laws
against price fixing by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-258 (1950). Although not prohibited by statute, the Com-
mission does not allow upward deviations.
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In order to stimulate competition,93 companies are allowed to file inde-
pendently if they have enough credible experience to establish rates.
Rates other than manual rates or those based on deviations or inde-
pendent filings may be charged to insureds obtaining coverage through
the Virginia Automobile Insurance Plan ("Assigned Risk")," and also
to those purchasing the substandard market, 5 or to insureds desiring
an excess rate for a specific risk.0
Investment Income as a Factor in Automobile Insurance Rates
Insurance companies receive income not only from the insurance
portion of their business, but also from investing the policyholder's
premium dollar. Income earned from investment of the policyholder's
premium in bonds, debentures, preferred and common stock, mortgages,
and other forms of real estate investments is referred to broadly as "in-
vestment income." For many years, insurance companies argued that
they were not required to consider investment income in deriving the
amount of profit built into the insurance rates. The investment portion
was said to be completely separate from the underwriting portion which
should stand on its own. 7
Before 1965, the Commission did not consider investment income
in establishing automobile insurance rates. In 1965, the Commission
93. See Id. § 38.1-218.
94. Id. § 38.1-264.
95. Id. § 38.1-262.1.
96. Id. § 38.1-262. In addition, individual companies may propose certain variations in
plans. For example, the "Safe Driver Plan" offers approximately a five percent discount
from the basic manual rate; in return, the company may charge a premium that is 300
percent of the basic manual rate if a certain number of points are obtained. Judge Cat-
terall, who opposes this plan, has commented that:
The odds that [the insured] will win this gamble are six to one in his favor,
the same as the odds in the game of Russian roulette.... A man who is more
interested in saving money than in gambling can buy a policy from several
large companies whose rates are more than 5 percent below the manual rates
and whose policies do not contain the safe-driver plan. 1969 S.C.C. ANN.
REP. 151, 161-62.
97. This led to the now-famous "two-pocket" speech by the Chairman of the United
States Senate Sub-Committee on Antitrust and Monopoly on October 15, 1968, to the
National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents in which he stated: "When someone
turns his pocket inside out to show you how empty it is, but has $7 billion in the other
pocket, it is difficult to take their claim of poverty too seriously."
98. Income from the investment of the unearned premium reserve previously had
been considered in fixing fire insurance rates. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 160 Va.
698, 169 S.E. 859 (1933). In Aetna it was stated: "It would appear to be just as reason-
able in computing profit made from the purchase and sale of a flock of sheep to omit
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began to consider evidence of income earned from unearned premium
reserves, 99 and in 1969, the Virginia Supreme Court, in Virginia AFL-
(10 v. Commonwealth,100 required the Commission to consider invest-
ment income from loss reserves as well. It should be noted, however,
that in determining investment income, the Commission considers net
realized capital gains but does not consider net unrealized capital gains.' 0'
Since insurance rates are based on profits the companies should be
allowed for each dollar of insurance written, it would appear that if
an adequate profit factor were built into the rate, increases in policy
sales would produce an increased company return. 0 2 On this theory,
the Commission does not attempt to fix the overall return to the com-
pany based on either its total investment or its net worth. The policy
of encouraging insurance companies to compete cannot be implemented
effectively if the overall return to the company is set by a regulatory
body.
The Virginia Insurance Market
There has been an increasing restrictiveness and tightening of the
insurance market in Virginia, even among the larger independent com-
panies which often write at lower rates.10s In Commonwealth ex rel.
State Corporation Commission v. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,104
the Commission emphasized the dilemma confronting it: "It has been
our experience that many of the large independent companies have
lower expenses. Many of them are more selective in deciding which
group of motorists is least likely to give rise to claims; and their ex-
from the computation the income received from the wool clip and the natural increase
at the lambing season, as to discard in the computation of profits produced by rates
the increase in income due to the investment of that portion of the premiums held in
hand to meet existing but future payable liabilities." Id. at 721, 169 SE. at 867.
99. 1965 SCC A~w. REP. 94, 100-01.
100. 209 Va. 776 (1969). For a brief historical sketch of insurance regulation and an
enlightening discussion of investment income with emphasis given to Virginia, see Com-
ment, Insurance, Ratemaking Problems: Administrative Discretion, Investment Income,
and Prepaid Expenses, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 95 (1969).
101. See 1969 SCC, ANN. REP. 151, 158.
102. This is similar to the "operating-ratio" theory of rate making and is unlike public
-utility rate making, in which the Commission sets a return on net worth.
103. It can be argued that the insurance market will tend to be more restrictive in
periods of high inflation. As a result of recent evidence, however, the Bureau of In-
surance now indicates that the tightening of the insurance market is no longer as critical
as it was in the late 1960's and that the market is actually becoming less restrictive.
104. Record No. 17680 (Va., May 15, 1967).
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penses, particularly their acquisition costs, are lower. They can afford
to charge lower rates because they insure better risks at lower costs of
doing business and they appeal to the better risks because they charge
lower rates." 105
Given the restrictive market and the need to insure all motorists, a
problem developed concerning the means by which all Virginians could
be enabled to obtain insurance from the company of their choice at fair
and reasonable rates. A recent Commission study has proposed five area&
of improvement:
(1) the annualization of the rate-making process in insurance,
(2) the trending of losses in such a manner as to rectify the con-
tinual underprovision that examination of the historical evi-
dence reveals,
(3) the treatment of investment income from policyholder sup-
plied funds counterpart to the loss and unearned premium re-
serves,
(4) the setting of a factor in the rate-making formula for under-
writing profit, and
(5) improved use of a factor in the rate-making formula to ac-
count for risk differentials by line of insurance.' 06
The matter is still pending with no positive results yet achieved.
Competitive Pricing
Because of complaints about the serious restrictions in the insurance
market, the Governor in early 1971 requested that a committee of the
Virginia Advisory Legislative Council study the matter. The insurance
companies represented to the committee that the insurance market would
loosen up if the General Assembly passed a "competitive pricing"
law. Such a law would substantially eliminate the lag that now exists
between the time revised rates are submitted by the companies and the
time they can be used under the present "prior approval" system. The
companies also would be provided with more flexibility in setting rates,
and thus they would have little reason to reject prospective policy-
105. 1967 S.C.C. ANN. RiE. 20, 31.
105. See Introductory letter to the S.C.C. Study Report of October 1, 1971. The Office
of the Attorney General sponsored legislation providing for the annual review of in-
surance rates which was passed by the 1972 session of the General Assembly and appears
as section 38.1-255.1 in the present code. This legislation is similar to that which applies
to public utilities. VA. CODE ANN. 38.1-255.1 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
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-holders willing to pay the cost. Competition, the companies argued,
would keep the rates reasonable.
The VALC Study Committee presented a "competitive pricing" bill
,to the 1972 session of the General Assembly. The bill was introduced
in the House and although the Attorney General, the Corporation Corn-
-mission, and much of the insurance industry voiced strong objections,
it passed.07 The Governor signed the bill to become effective July 1,
1972, in spite of the Attorney General's advice-given at the Governor's
request-that he veto it due to certain inherent defects. On July 6, 1972,
,the Commission found the law unconstitutional. 10 8
Broadly, this law is a "file and use" law by which the companies
-can file their rates along with "supplemental rate information." Im-
mediately after filing, the new rates may be used. Commission approval
,of the rates is not required. It is suggested, however, that either the
state must be the regulator of insurance rates or competition must be
the regulator. If the state is to be the regulator, then the only practical
way this can be accomplished is by a method of "prior approval" sim-
ilar to the one Virginia now has. The pending study by the Commission
may provide some answers for improving the implementation of the
-system. On the other hand, if competition is to be the regulator, the
companies must be allowed a realistic opportunity to compete.
Such an opportunity can only be afforded under a flexible "use and
no file" plan such as has existed in California for many years."" There
is no middle ground. The success of any law appearing to offer such
middle ground must depend on the cooperation of the regulatory
body in reacting as if the law were in fact a California type of law.
Such legislation creates expectations in the mind of the public of regu-
latory controls and rate making standards which are not in fact em-
ployed." 0 Under a true "open competition" law, the Commission's
role is that of an anti-trust watchdog guarding against anti-competitive
practices such as illegal price fixing and collusion.
107. The objections related primarily to the form of the bill and not to the theory
of "competitive pricing."
108. Record No. 19145 (Va., July 6, 1972). Further discussion of this particular law is
not appropriate at this writing, since the Office of, Attorney General is a party to the
appeal presently before the Supreme Court of Virginia.
109. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1850-1860.3 (West 1955).
110. For instance, a "file and use" bill suggests that the Commission has examined the
filed information, but experience shows that many commissions with "file and use" laws
never look at the filed information and act as if the law were instead a "use and no
file" law.
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If "open competition" is adopted, the companies should not be re-
stricted by specific prior-approval type standards for setting rates. The
policies offered to the public, however, should be of a standard form,
subject to Commission approval, in order to provide a basis for a
company-by-company comparison of rates. If the rates of a particular
company are too high, that company should lose business. On the
other hand, the commission also should monitor rates closely to ensure
that they are not so low that the company's solvency and ability to pay
claims is jeopardized.
Obviously, the success of any "open competition" law depends on
a vigorous "shopping around" by the consuming public. To encourage
such "shopping," the public must be knowledgeable about the variations
in rates. One way to accomplish this is for the Bureau of Insurance to
publish periodically a list of the filed rates of the companies.-' A sub-
stantial obligation also should be placed upon insurance agents to inform
their clients of the alternatives available to them.
Few consumers shop for insurance. Their buying habits must be
changed, since the theory of open competition can be tested successfully
only through the reactions of a fully informed public. Anything less
than true competition is not "open competition" at all, but loose, and
consequently ineffective, state regulation.
CONCLUSION
The placing of the responsibility for the fixing of railroad rates in
the hands of the State Corporation Commission at the 1902 Virginia
Convention was characterized as "populism run mad." 112 Since that
time it cannot be said that the use of strong epithets to characterize the
Commission has diminished one iota. Ironically the Commission has
evolved as an institution to the point where its policies frequently are
regarded as suspect by those today identified with "populism run mad.'
The rate making function of the Commission is certainly as much
a factor in its high profile position in state government as any combina-
tion of other responsibilities it performs. Such a highly technical and
111. A bill to correct certain defects in Virginia's 1972 "Competitive Pricing" legisla-
tion contained in Chapter 6.1 of title 38.1 of the Code passed the 1973 session of the
General Assembly repealing Chapter 6.1 and enacting a new chapter 6.2. The bill was
amended in the Senate at the request of Senator Clive Duval to require the Commission
to publish such a list of rates periodically as a matter of law.
112. In re C & P Tel. Co., 91 P.U.R.3d 437, 451 (S.C.C. 1971) (Catterall, Comm'r,
concurring).
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broad area of discretion cannot be exercised effectively without sub-
stantial public confidence. No service is performed on behalf of the
public when this confidence is undermined by baseless accusations.
Informed public examination and review should be had of all Com-
mission decisions. On its part, the Commission must aggressively study
and adopt improvements in its policies and procedures. In so doing, the
Commission will react appropriately to legitimate public concern and
merit the confidence of the citizens it serves.
